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Philosopher Kings Reynolds v Sims Created:30-Apr-2022

FREE AMERICA!!!

A Sentinel for LIBERTY!

Our LIBERTY under God,

In Our REPUBLIC!

The Philosopher-Kings'

Four Horsemen Riding for America's Demise:

Baker v. Carr, Gray v. Sanders, Wesberry v. Sanders, Reynolds v. Sims

[See the links in the Side Menu, and "Redistricting One Man One Vote" in the Horizontal Menu, above, for Wesberry v. Sanders.]

Reynolds v. Sims (1964)

This case presents a more impactful exposition of the "one man, one vote" principle woven from whole cloth by Chief Justice Warren and his Majority Cohorts, beginning in 1962, with Baker v. Carr. It seems that proponents of "democracy," are mesmerized by propaganda repeated ad nauseum! After my brief comments, I am pasting below only the main points Held by the Warren Opinion and boiled-down at the beginning of the Decision. Following this clip, I have pasted excerpts from the beginning and the end of Justice Harlan's Dissent. I do suggest that those interested in the true history of the Fourteenth Amendment read all of Harlan's Dissent, which is greatly augmented by facts drawn from Raoul Berger's Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment,.

[I tried to plod through all of the gobbledy-gook, as Warren danced--seemingly forever!--with those Imaginary Angels on the head of that Proverbial Pin! But, in the interest of publishing this work before the 2022 "Election Cycle" ends, I moved-on to Justice Harlan's reasoned, rational and logical Dissent! You can follow the link, above, to read the entire Decision.]

When the Warren Court fired the Baker v. Carr nuclear weapon, I was 13-years-old, in the 8th Grade at Paradise Valley Elementary School #1. So, I had been indoctrinated and programmed for ten years (Play School & Kindergarten in Illinois), in earnest, along with my Fellow-American, public school pupils of over half-a-century at that point, to accept democratic principles, by Public Instruction: deconstruction, propaganda and indoctrination.

We were programmed to be confused by the Arguments coming from the Progressive Radicals' 20th Century manifestation of Plato's "Republic" and his "Philosopher-Kings" (in the guise of the Supreme Court of the United States), playing-out the evil, millenia-long agenda of the "Mystery Schools." [Beware the worshippers of "light!" To consider another world of historical facts we have NOT been taught, see: probablyalexandra.]

After decades of pounding-on the propaganda surrounding the "Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment," setting-us-up for the Court's usurpation of power in the form of the "one man, one vote" concept arising from a completely false interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court and the Congress colluded in subverting and overturning our Republican Form of Government!

The timing of this revolutionary opening volley by Judicial Tyrants was right in-line with the concurrent attacks on the fabric of our Representative Republic on many Fronts in the Decade of the '60s. Their Evil Revolution has succeeded beyond imagining, to foist upon our Nation the embodiment of Plato's Republic, in the guise of judges sitting as our Overlords, in the Office of Plato's "Philosopher-Kings!"

The purely "democratic" Majority Rule concept of "one man, one vote," intended to fool We the People, while ushering-in Oligarchic Tyranny, was further-imposed as a judicial mandate in successive decisions; especially Gray v. Sanders (1963), and Wesberry v. Sanders (1964), culminating in Reynolds v. Sims (1964).

These decisions generated a tsunami among the States, who scrambled to comply with the 180-degree departure from the U.S. Constitution and their own Constitutions. In Reynolds v. Sims, the Progressive Court reinforced exposition of its unconstitutional coup d'etat; the States have grovelled for 60-years to lick the hands of the Philosopher-Kings as they [and, We, like the Three Blind Mice!] have followed them down the Redistricting Rabbit Hole they've dug into the Depths of Oligarchic Tyranny!

SCOTUS Decision in Reynolds v. Sims:

Held:

1. The right of suffrage is denied by debasement or dilution of a citizen's vote in a state or federal election. Pp. 377 U. S. 554-555.

2. Under the Equal Protection Clause, a claim of debasement of the right to vote through malapportionment presents a justiciable controversy, and the Equal Protection Clause provides manageable standards for lower courts to determine the constitutionality of a state legislative apportionment scheme. Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, followed. Pp. 377 U. S. 556-557.

3. The Equal Protection Clause requires substantially equal legislative representation for all citizens in a State regardless of where they reside. Pp. 377 U. S. 56l-568.

(a) Legislators represent people, not areas. P. 377 U. S. 562.

(b) Weighting votes differently according to where citizens happen to reside is discriminatory. Pp. 377 U. S. 563-568.

4. The seats in both houses of a bicameral legislature must, under the Equal Protection Clause, be apportioned substantially on a population basis. Pp. 377 U.S. 568-576.

5. The District Court correctly held that the existing Alabama apportionment scheme and both of the proposed plans are constitutionally invalid, since neither legislative house is or would thereunder be apportioned on a population basis. Pp. 377 U.S. 568-571.

6. The superficial resemblance between one of the Alabama apportionment plans and the legislative representation scheme of the Federal Congress affords no proper basis for sustaining that plan, since the historical circumstances which gave rise to the congressional system of representation, arising out of compromise among sovereign States, are unique and without relevance to the allocation of seats in state legislatures. Pp. 377 U.S. 571-577.

7. The federal constitutional requirement that both houses of a state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis means that, as nearly as practicable, districts be of equal population, though mechanical exactness is not required. Somewhat more

Page 377 U. S. 535

flexibility may be constitutionally permissible for state legislative apportionment than for congressional districting. Pp. 377 U.S. 577-581.

(a) A state legislative apportionment scheme may properly give representation to various political subdivisions and provide for compact districts of contiguous territory if substantial equality among districts is maintained. Pp. 377 U.S. 578-579.

(b) Some deviations from a strict equal population principle are constitutionally permissible in the two houses of a bicameral state legislature, where incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy, so long as the basic standard of equality of population among districts is not significantly departed from. P. 377 U.S. 579.

(c) Considerations of history, economic or other group interests, or area alone do not justify deviations from the equal population principle. Pp. 377 U.S. 579-580.

(d) Insuring some voice to political subdivisions in at least one legislative body may, within reason, warrant some deviations from population-based representation in state legislatures. Pp. 377 U.S. 580-581.

8. In admitting States into the Union, Congress does not purport to pass on all constitutional questions concerning the character of state governmental organization, such as whether a state legislature's apportionment departs from the equal population principle; in any case, congressional approval could not validate an unconstitutional state legislative apportionment. P. 377 U.S. 582.

9. States, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, can properly provide for periodic revision of reapportionment schemes, though revision less frequent than decennial would be constitutionally suspect. Pp. 377 U.S. 583-584.

10. Courts should attempt to accommodate the relief ordered to the apportionment provisions of state constitutions as far as possible, provided that such provisions harmonize with the Equal Protection Clause. P. 377 U.S. 584.

11. A court, in awarding or withholding immediate relief, should consider the proximity of a forthcoming election and the mechanics and complexities of election laws, and should rely on general equitable principles. P. 377 U.S. 585.

12. The District Court properly exercised its judicial power in this case by ordering reapportionment of both houses of the Alabama Legislature for purposes of 1962 elections as a temporary measure by using the best parts of the two proposed plans, each of which it had found, as a whole, invalid, and in retaining jurisdiction while deferring a hearing on the issuance of a final injunction

Page 377 U. S. 536

to give the reapportioned legislature an opportunity to act effectively. Pp. 377 U.S. 586-587.

208 F. Supp. 431, affirmed and remanded for further proceedings.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

* * * * [See the ramblings of Warren, Clark and Stewart in the file.]

[Following are two lengthy excerpts, one from the beginning of Justice Harlan's Dissent, and the second from his closing statements and Conclusion]

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting.*

In these cases, the Court holds that seats in the legislatures of six States [Footnote 2/1] are apportioned in ways that violate the Federal Constitution. Under the Court's ruling, it is bound to follow that the legislatures in all but a few of the other 44 States will meet the same fate. [Footnote 2/2] These decisions, with Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1, involving congressional districting by the States, and Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368, relating to elections for statewide office, have the effect of placing basic aspects of state political systems under the pervasive overlordship of the federal judiciary. Once again, [Footnote 2/3] I must register my protest.

Page 377 U. S. 590

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Today's holding is that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires every State to structure its legislature so that all the members of each house represent substantially the same number of people; other factors may be given play only to the extent that they do not significantly encroach on this basic "population" principle. Whatever may be thought of this holding as a piece of political ideology -- and even on that score, the political history and practices of this country from its earliest beginnings leave wide room for debate (see the dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J., in Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 369 U.S. 266, 369 U.S. 301-323) -- I think it demonstrable that the Fourteenth Amendment does not impose this political tenet on the States or authorize this Court to do so.

The Court's constitutional discussion, found in its opinion in the Alabama cases (Nos. 23, 27, 41, ante, p. 377 U. S. 533) and more particularly at pages 377 U. S. 561-568 thereof, is remarkable (as, indeed, is that found in the separate opinions of my Brothers STEWART and CLARK, ante, pp. 377 U.S. 588, 377 U.S. 587) for its failure to address itself at all to the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole or to the legislative history of the Amendment pertinent to the matter at hand. Stripped of aphorisms, the Court's argument boils down to the assertion that appellees' right to vote has been invidiously "debased" or "diluted" by systems of apportionment which entitle them to vote for fewer legislators than other voters, an assertion which is tied to the Equal Protection Clause only by the constitutionally frail tautology that "equal" means "equal."

Had the Court paused to probe more deeply into the matter, it would have found that the Equal Protection Clause was never intended to inhibit the States in choosing

Page 377 U. S. 591

any democratic method they pleased for the apportionment of their legislatures. This is shown by the language of the Fourteenth Amendment taken as a whole, by the understanding of those who proposed and ratified it, and by the political practices of the States at the time the Amendment was adopted. It is confirmed by numerous state and congressional actions since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and by the common understanding of the Amendment as evidenced by subsequent constitutional amendments and decisions of this Court before Baker v. Carr, supra, made an abrupt break with the past in 1962.

The failure of the Court to consider any of these matters cannot be excused or explained by any concept of "developing" constitutionalism. It is meaningless to speak of constitutional "development" when both the language and history of the controlling provisions of the Constitution are wholly ignored. Since it can, I think, be shown beyond doubt that state legislative apportionments, as such, are wholly free of constitutional limitations, save such as may be imposed by the Republican Form of Government Clause (Const., Art. IV, § 4), [Footnote 2/4] the Court's action now bringing them within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment amounts to nothing less than an exercise of the amending power by this Court.

So far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, the complaints in these cases should all have been dismissed below for failure to state a cause of action, because what

Page 377 U. S. 592

has been alleged or proved shows no violation of any constitutional right.

Before proceeding to my argument, it should be observed that nothing done in Baker v. Carr, supra, or in the two cases that followed in its wake, Gray v. Sanders and Wesberry v. Sanders, supra, from which the Court quotes at some length, forecloses the conclusion which I reach.

Baker decided only that claims such as those made here are within the competence of the federal courts to adjudicate. Although the Court stated as its conclusion that the allegations of a denial of equal protection presented "a justiciable constitutional cause of action," 369 U.S. at 369 U.S. 237, it is evident from the Court's opinion that it was concerned all but exclusively with justiciability, and gave no serious attention to the question whether the Equal Protection Clause touches state legislative apportionments. [Footnote 2/5] Neither the opinion of the Court nor any of the concurring opinions considered the relevant text of the Fourteenth Amendment or any of the historical materials bearing on that question. None of the materials was briefed or otherwise brought to the Court's attention. [Footnote 2/6]

Page 377 U. S. 593

In the Gray case, the Court expressly laid aside the applicability to state legislative apportionments of the "one person, one vote" theory there found to require the striking down of the Georgia county unit system. See 372 U.S. at 372 U. S. 376, and the concurring opinion of STEWART, J., joined by CLARK, J., id. at 372 U. S. 381-382.

In Wesberry, involving congressional districting, the decision rested on Art. I, § 2, of the Constitution. The Court expressly did not reach the arguments put forward concerning the Equal Protection Clause. See 376 U.S. at 376 U. S. 8, note 10.

Thus, it seems abundantly clear that the Court is entirely free to deal with the cases presently before it in light of materials now called to its attention for the first time. To these I now turn.

. . . . [Continuing Justice Harlan's Dissent at his closing statements.}

This Court now approves all these

Page 377 U. S. 620

proceedings, noting particularly that, in allowing the 1962 elections to go forward, "the District Court acted in a wise and temperate manner." Post, p. 377 U. S. 710. [Footnote 2/81]

Records such as these in the cases decided today are sure to be duplicated in most of the other States if they have not been already. They present a jarring picture of courts threatening to take action in an area which they have no business entering, inevitably on the basis of political judgments which they are incompetent to make. They show legislatures of the States meeting in haste and deliberating and deciding in haste to avoid the threat of judicial interference. So far as I can tell, the Court's only response to this unseemly state of affairs is ponderous insistence that "a denial of constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection," ante, p. 377 U.S. 566. By thus refusing to recognize the bearing which a potential for

Page 377 U. S. 621

conflict of this kind may have on the question whether the claimed rights are, in fact, constitutionally entitled to judicial protection, the Court assumes, rather than supports, its conclusion.

It should by now be obvious that these cases do not mark the end of reapportionment problems in the courts. Predictions once made that the courts would never have to face the problem of actually working out an apportionment have proved false. This Court, however, continues to avoid the consequences of its decisions, simply assuring us that the lower courts "can and . . . will work out more concrete and specific standards," ante, p. 377 U.S. 578. Deeming it "expedient" not to spell out "precise constitutional tests," the Court contents itself with stating "only a few rather general considerations." Ibid.

Generalities cannot obscure the cold truth that cases of this type are not amenable to the development of judicial standards. No set of standards can guide a court which has to decide how many legislative districts a State shall have, or what the shape of the districts shall be, or where to draw a particular district line. No judicially manageable standard can determine whether a State should have single member districts or multi-member districts or some combination of both. No such standard can control the balance between keeping up with population shifts and having stable districts. In all these respects, the courts will be called upon to make particular decisions with respect to which a principle of equally populated districts will be of no assistance whatsoever. Quite obviously, there are limitless possibilities for districting consistent with such a principle. Nor can these problems be avoided by judicial reliance on legislative judgments so far as possible. Reshaping or combining one or two districts, or modifying just a few district lines, is no less a matter of choosing among many possible

Page 377 U. S. 622

solutions, with varying political consequences, than reapportionment broadside. [Footnote 2/82]

The Court ignores all this, saying only that "what is marginally permissible in one State may be unsatisfactory in another, depending on the particular circumstances of the case," ante, p. 377 U.S. 578. It is well to remember that the product of today's decisions will not be readjustment of a few districts in a few States which most glaringly depart from the principle of equally populated districts. It will be a redetermination, extensive in many cases, of legislative districts in all but a few States.

Although the Court -- necessarily, as I believe -- provides only generalities in elaboration of its main thesis, its opinion nevertheless fully demonstrates how far removed these problems are from fields of judicial competence. Recognizing that "indiscriminate districting" is an invitation to "partisan gerrymandering," ante pp. 377 U.S. 578-579, the Court nevertheless excludes virtually every basis for the formation of electoral districts other than "indiscriminate districting." In one or another of today's opinions, the Court declares it unconstitutional for a State to give effective consideration to any of the following in establishing legislative districts:

(1) history; [Footnote 2/83]

(2) "economic or other sorts of group interests"; [Footnote 2/84]

(3) area; [Footnote 2/85]

(4) geographical considerations; [Footnote 2/86]

(5) a desire "to insure effective representation for sparsely settled areas"; [Footnote 2/87]

Page 377 U. S. 623

(6) "availability of access of citizens to their representatives"; [Footnote 2/88]

(7) theories of bicameralism (except those approved by the Court); [Footnote 2/89]

(8) occupation; [Footnote 2/90]

(9) "an attempt to balance urban and rural power." [Footnote 2/91]

(10) the preference of a majority of voters in the state. [Footnote 2/92]

So far as presently appears, the only factor which a State may consider, apart from numbers, is political subdivisions. But even "a clearly rational state policy" recognizing this factor is unconstitutional if "population is submerged as the controlling consideration. . . ." [Footnote 2/93]

I know of no principle of logic or practical or theoretical politics, still less any constitutional principle, which establishes all or any of these exclusions. Certain it is that the Court's opinion does not establish them. So far as the Court says anything at all on this score, it says only that "legislators represent people, not trees or acres," ante, p. 377 U. S. 662; that "citizens, not history or economic interests, cast votes," ante, p. 377 U.S. 580; that "people, not land or trees or pastures, vote," ibid. [Footnote 2/94] All this may be conceded. But it is surely equally obvious, and, in the context of elections, more meaningful, to note that people are not ciphers, and that legislators can represent their electors only by speaking

Page 377 U. S. 624

for their interests -- economic, social, political -- many of which do reflect the place where the electors live. The Court does not establish, or indeed even attempt to make a case for the proposition that conflicting interests within a State can only be adjusted by disregarding them when voters are grouped for purposes of representation.

CONCLUSION

With these cases, the Court approaches the end of the third round set in motion by the complaint filed in Baker v. Carr. What is done today deepens my conviction that judicial entry into this realm is profoundly ill-advised and constitutionally impermissible. As I have said before, Wesberry v. Sanders, supra, at 376 U. S. 48, I believe that the vitality of our political system, on which, in the last analysis, all else depends, is weakened by reliance on the judiciary for political reform; in time, a complacent body politic may result.

These decisions also cut deeply into the fabric of our federalism. What must follow from them may eventually appear to be the product of state legislatures. Nevertheless, no thinking person can fail to recognize that the aftermath of these cases, however desirable it may be thought in itself, will have been achieved at the cost of a radical alteration in the relationship between the States and the Federal Government, more particularly the Federal Judiciary. Only one who has an overbearing impatience with the federal system and its political processes will believe that that cost was not too high, or was inevitable.

Finally, these decisions give support to a current mistaken view of the Constitution and the constitutional function of this Court. This view, in a nutshell, is that every major social ill in this country can find its cure in some constitutional "principle," and that this Court should "take the lead" in promoting reform when other branches of government fail to act. The Constitution is

Page 377 U. S. 625

not a panacea for every blot upon the public welfare, nor should this Court, ordained as a judicial body, be thought of as a general haven for reform movements. The Constitution is an instrument of government, fundamental to which is the premise that in a diffusion of governmental authority lies the greatest promise that this Nation will realize liberty for all its citizens. This Court, limited in function in accordance with that premise, does not serve its high purpose when it exceeds its authority, even to satisfy justified impatience with the slow workings of the political process. For when, in the name of constitutional interpretation, the Court adds something to the Constitution that was deliberately excluded from it, the Court, in reality, substitutes its view of what should be so for the amending process.

I dissent in each of these cases, believing that in none of them have the plaintiffs stated a cause of action. To the extent that Baker v. Carr, expressly or by implication, went beyond a discussion of jurisdictional doctrines independent of the substantive issues involved here, it should be limited to what it, in fact, was: an experiment in venturesome constitutionalism. I would reverse the judgments of the District Courts in Nos. 23, 27, and 41 (Alabama), No. 69 (Virginia), and No. 307 (Delaware), and remand with directions to dismiss the complaints. I would affirm the judgments of the District Courts in No. 20 (New York), and No. 508 (Colorado), and of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in No. 29.

. . .

Without LIBERTY, Freedom cannot exist!

LIBERTY begins in our own BACKYARD!

 

 

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